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Abstract:
The economic expansion of China is one of the most spectacular cases of today’s global economy,
where this East Asian country is increasingly integrated through foreign direct investments (FDI)
and rising trade flows. Chinese firms has been building strong economic ties with Asia, Latin
America and Africa where they search for markets and natural resources. Developed economies of
Europe and the United States also became their important targets recently, offering markets for
Chinese products and assets Chinese firms lack. We can observe rising Chinese economic presence
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) too. Investment inflows are currently expected to increase
further due to recent political developments, while the intensity of trade has been growing too,
especially with certain countries.
The aim of the paper is to analyse the characteristics of Chinese economic presence in CEE
countries focusing on investment and trade flows. After the introductory section and the discussion
of theory and literature, the paper presents the changing patterns and motivations of Chinese
foreign economic relations. The main part of the paper describes the China-CEE economic relations
highlighting the similarities and differences of Chinese practices in CEE and other developed
economies. According to our first hypothesis, Chinese motivations and practices in the CEE region
differ somewhat (a) from the developed countries’ presence in the CEE region as well as (b) from
the motivations and practices of Chinese companies in developing countries. As a second
hypothesis we set that the crisis accelerated the Chinese companies’ interest toward this region
due to new opportunities for Chinese companies and increasing receptiveness from CEE side.
The first part of this paper examines Chinese investment in the six main CEE destination countries
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia), analyzing the most important
sectors, motivations, trends and differences of FDI inflow. We apply the eclectic paradigm of
Dunning for explaining Chinese investments, analyzing to what extent they are valid. The second
part describes trade flows between China and the main CEE partners. We find that the bulk of
foreign trade between CEE countries and China can be bound to certain products and certain
multinational companies. Mutual trade flows thus are largely dependent on the activities of global
value chains. Finally we draw some policy implications concerning mutual economic relationship.
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Introduction1 
  
The economic expansion of China is one of the most spectacular cases of today’s 
global economy, where this East Asian country is increasingly integrated through 
foreign direct investments (FDI) and rising trade flows. Chinese firms have been 
building strong economic ties with Asia, Latin America and Africa where they search 
for markets and natural resources. Developed economies of Europe and the United 
States also became their important targets recently, offering markets for Chinese 
products and assets Chinese firms lack. We can observe rising Chinese economic 
presence in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) too. Investment inflows are currently 
expected to increase further due to recent political developments, while the intensity of 
trade has been growing too, especially with certain countries.  
 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the characteristics of Chinese economic presence 
in CEE countries focusing on investment and trade flows. After the introductory 
section and the discussion of theory and literature, the paper presents the changing 
patterns and motivations of Chinese foreign economic relations. The main part of the 
paper describes the China-CEE economic relations highlighting the similarities and 
differences of Chinese practices in CEE and other developed economies. According to 
our first hypothesis, Chinese companies used to treat the region as a back door to 
European markets but recently their motivations have slightly expanded towards 
efficiency- and strategic asset seeking motives. As a second hypothesis we set that 
the crisis accelerated the Chinese companies’ interest toward this region due to new 
opportunities for Chinese companies and increasing receptiveness from CEE side.  
 
The first part of this paper examines Chinese investment in the six main CEE 
destination countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia), analyzing the most important sectors, motivations, trends and differences of 
FDI inflow. We apply the eclectic paradigm of Dunning for explaining Chinese 
investments, analyzing to what extent they are valid. The second part describes trade 
flows between China and the main CEE partners. We find that the bulk of foreign trade 
between CEE countries and China can be bound to certain products and certain 
multinational companies. Mutual trade flows thus are largely dependent on the 
activities of global value chains. Finally we draw some policy implications concerning 
mutual economic relationship. 
 
Theoretical framework and relevant literature on China-CEE relations 
Majority of research on motivations for FDI apply the eclectic or OLI paradigm by 
Dunning (1992, 1998) that states that firms will venture abroad when they possess 
firm-specific advantages, i.e. ownership (O) and internalization (I) advantages, and 
when they can utilize location (L) advantages to benefit from the attractions these 
                                                 
1 This paper was supported by the 2015 scholarship of the Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship 
Fund and by the OTKA Fund project no. K115578 titled “Factors influencing export performance –  a 
comparison of three European regions”. 
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locations are embedded with. Different types of investment incentives attract different 
types of FDI which Dunning (1992) divided into four categories: market-seeking, 
resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and asset-seeking. Location advantages 
“comprise geographical and climate conditions, resource endowments, factor prices, 
transportation costs, as well as the degree of openness of a country and the presence 
of a business environment appropriate to ensure to a foreign firm a profitable activity” 
(Resmini, 2005, p 3). Much of the extant research and theoretical discussion is based 
on FDI outflows from developed countries for which market-seeking and efficiency-
seeking FDI is most prominent (Buckley et al. 2007; Leitao-Faustino 2010). 
 
The rapid growth of OFDI from emerging and developing countries resulted in 
numerous studies trying to account for special features of emerging multinationals 
(MNCs) behavior that is not captured within mainstream theories. For example, 
Mathews extended OLI paradigm with linking, leverage, learning framework (LLL) that 
explains rapid international expansion of companies (“Dragon multinationals”) from 
Asia Pacific (Mathews 2006), while Dunning and Lundan extended the OLI model with 
the institution-based location advantages which explains that institutions developed at 
home and host economies shape the geographical scope and organizational 
effectiveness of MNCs (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). A further extension of the OLI 
framework with a fourth pillar was made by Kalotay-Sulstarova (2002). This pillar is a 
“H” which means a home country factor, referring mostly to state help and ownership. 
This was tested mostly on Russian multinationals (Kalotay et al. 2015) but can be 
highly relevant for Chinese ones too. 
 
The activity of multinational companies is strongly apparent in trade. Fragmentation of 
production has increased to a considerable extent in the last decade, mostly in the 
electronic, clothing and automotive industry2 (Lall et al. 2004, Kimura et al. 2005, 
Vogiatzoglou 2012). International trade in such global production networks has risen 
much faster then “normal” trade. According to the report of UNCTAD (2013) 80 per 
cent of global trade (gross exports) is linked to the production network of multinational 
companies.  
 
As a consequence, economic theories and literature on global production chains (or 
vertical specialisation, fragmentation of production, global value chains) proliferated. 
Knowing the distinction of the various notions, we will use the term global value chain 
(GVC) in this article. There are several streams of the GVC theories. One part of the 
literature explains their development and role for connecting developing economies 
(Baldwin 2012, Gereffi 2013 and others) other part deals with the governance of GVCs 
(Gereffi 2005, Lee–Gereffi 2014), another part focuses on upgrading within GVCs and 
its forms (Humphrey-Schmitz 2002, Cattaneo et al. 2013, Barrientos et al. 2010, 
Milberg-Winkler 2011) and yet another part with the measurement of their activity 
                                                 
2 The intensity of production fragmentation depends on certain factors like technically separable stages, 
factor intensity, the technological complexity of production and the weight of the product (transportable 
to large distances).  
International Journal of Business and Management Vol. IV, No. 1 / 2016
27
especially in trade. The “trade in value-added” concept has been introduced and large 
databases were developed based on input-output tables of countries (Foster et al. 
2013, Timmer et al. 2014, Koopman et al. 2014). 
 
GVCs have an effect on trade theories too, the concept of revealed comparative 
advantage and real effective exchange rates for example have lost from their 
explanataory power. The country of origin concept has also become difficult to apply in 
trade policy.  Based on trade data a country may appear to be a large exporter of a 
specific good relative to the world average without having contributed much value 
added to its production (Amador – di Mauro 2015). Beltramello et al. (2012) also show 
that the dominant role of GVCs questions export based competition indices, because 
export specialisation (for example to higher technology goods) is often based on high 
import content. Therefore real technological development, innovative activity behind 
the export of high-tech products is questionable or non existent. Countries with low 
R&D activities also show high shares of high-tech products in their exports and this is 
characteristic for several low income Asian countries (Srholec 2005).3 The import 
content of Chinese high-tech exports increased radically (IMF 2012). China itself 
became in the meantime an assembly country too. (The increasing role of China in the 
global network of information, communication and technology industry is proven by 
Amighimi (2005)). Cross-border movement of parts and products within the same 
production network increases the trade of countries, “artificially” generating 
international trade with each crossing. 
 
During the transition to market economy, CEE countries went through radical 
economic changes. These changes had been largely induced by foreign capital. 
Foreign multinationals realised significant investment projects in this region and 
established their own production networks. This development path of the CEE 
countries served as an example for the “dependent market economy model” created 
by Nölke-Vliegenthardt (2009) The integration of several CEE countries into the global 
production chains and the drastic changes in production structure since the late 1990s 
were generally proven by others (Rahman-Zhao 2013, Timmer et al. 2012). Damijan 
et al. (2013) also concludes that inflow of FDI contributed significantly to the export 
restructuring of Central and Eastern European countries, but there are differences 
among countries.  
 
There have been only a few comprehensive researches focusing on relations between 
China and Central and Eastern Europe so far. Despite the recent change in the 
relations, the number and depth of available international scientific publications and 
other resources are limited. Majority of these publications (Song 2013, Éltető-
                                                 
3  Participation in these global production networks means producing the labour intensive phases 
of high-tech intensive production (Srholec 2005). As a consequence of the increased fragmentation of 
production the assembly of an electronic product or a part can be similarly intensive in cheap labour as 
the assembly of any other machine.  
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Szunomár 2015; Matura 2013; etc.) deal with political and/or economic relations of 
China and Central and Eastern Europe in general, while others focus more on 
investment issues between China and CEE countries (such as Woon 2003; Jacoby 
2014; Liu 2014; Szunomár-Völgyi-Matura 2014) or trade relations (Éltető-Völgyi 2013). 
 
Tuszynski (2015) describes the Polish role in the large CEE area -China cooperation 
briefly touching Chinese investment and trade with Poland. The article also shows the 
attitude of some CEE countries towards China. Pencea-Oehler-Sincai (2015) analyses 
Romanian trade and investment relations with China pointing to the increasing 
significance of bilateral relations. In a recent book, edited by Szunomár (2014) 
scholars from the Visegrad countries (V4) analyzed Chinese investments in Visegrad 
countries before and after the crisis with a special focus on Chinese investment. In 
addition to economic issues and intents, the authors examined the underlying political 
interests of both sides as well as the attitude of V4 societies to incoming Chinese 
capital and growing influence.  
 
Éltető-Toporowski (2013) give detailed analysis of the trade between the Visegrád 
countries and Asian regions between 2000 and 2012. Applying detailed product 
classification, they find high geographic and product concentration and changing 
product specialisation of Visegrád countries towards Asian countries. Based on these, 
they conclude that the integration of V4 countries into the global value chains of 
multinational companies is also apparent in their trade with Asia. 
Ando and Kimura (2013) analyse the trade and production contacts between Asia and 
Europe via the Central European countries. They show that in the past 15 years the 
CE region increasingly connects the two continents in three ways: First, due to the 
dominance of East Asia in the electronics industry, European multinationals have 
been importing electronic parts and components from their Asian affiliates and other 
Asian firms to use them for their production in the CE region. Second, the automotive 
industry agglomerations in the CE import machinery parts and components from Asia. 
Third, certain Asian firms themselves have invested in the CE countries and 
intensified sourcing from Asia. These factors have resulted in tight production links 
between East Asia and Central Europe to serve the European market.  
 
Investment relations 
 
Changing patterns and motivations of Chinese investment 
In hand with the “Open Door” policy reforms, the Chinese government encouraged the 
country’s investment abroad to integrate China to the global economy, although the 
only entities allowed to invest abroad were state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The total 
investment of these first years of this new policy was not significant and concentrated 
to the neighbouring countries, mainly to Hong Kong. The regulations were liberalized 
after 1985 and a wider range of enterprises – including private firms – was permitted 
to invest abroad. After 1992 (the year when Deng Xiaoping made his Southern China 
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tour), overseas investment increased dramatically, Chinese companies established 
overseas divisions almost all over the world, concentrated mainly in natural resources. 
Nevertheless, according to UNCTADstat, Chinese OFDI averaged only 453 million US 
dollars per year between 1982 and 1989 and 2.3 billion between 1990 and 1999.  
 
In 2000, before joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Chinese government 
initiated the “go global” (“zou chu qu”) policy, which was aimed to encourage domestic 
companies to become globally competitive. They introduced new policies to induce 
firms to engage in overseas activities in specific industries, notably in trade-related 
activities. In 2001 this encouragement was integrated and formalized within the 10th 
five-year plan, which also echoed the importance of the go global policy (Buckley et al 
2008). This policy shift was part of the continuing reform and liberalization of the 
Chinese economy and also reflected Chinese government’s desire to create 
internationally competitive and well-known companies and brands. Both the 11th and 
12nd five-year plan stressed again the importance of promoting and expanding OFDI, 
which became one of the main elements of China’s new development strategy.  
 
As recently the Chinese economy is facing new challenges and its economic strategy 
is transforming, the country’s global investment position is altering as well, however, a 
bit more than a decade ago the amount of Chinese OFDI was almost negligible. Both 
Chinese OFDI flow and stock have steadily increased in the last decade (see Figures 
1 and 2), particularly after 2008, due to the above mentioned policy shift and the 
changes in global economic conditions, that is, the global economic and financial 
crisis. The crisis brought more overseas opportunities to Chinese companies to raise 
their share in the world economy as the number of ailing or financially distressed firms 
has increased.  
 
Figure 1 China’s outward FDI flows at current prices, 1985-2013 
 
Data source: UNCTADStat 
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Figure 2. Chinese outward FDI stock at current prices, 1985-2013 
 
 
Data source: UNCTADStat 
While OFDI from the developed world decreased in several countries because of the 
recent global financial crisis, Chinese outward investments increased even more: 
between 2007 and 2011, OFDI from developed countries dropped by 32 per cent, 
while China’s grew by 189 per cent (He and Wang, 2014, p. 4; UNCTAD 2012). As a 
consequence, according to the World Investment Report 2013, China moved up from 
the sixth to the third largest investor in 2012, in the ranks of top investors after the 
United States and Japan.  Among developing countries China was the largest investor 
– as outward investment continued to grow, reaching a record level of 84 billion US 
dollars in 2012.  
 
Being one of the top investors of the developing world, since 2008 Chinese investment 
increased substantially in developed economies as well. Although this increase is 
impressive by all means, China still accounts for only 7% of total FDI inflows into the 
EU and 5 % to the US (see Figure 3). However, analysing the actual final destination 
of Chinese OFDI, Wang found that – as a result of round-tripping investments – 
developed countries receive more Chinese investments than developing economies: 
60 per cent of Chinese ODI went to developed economies like Australia, Hong Kong, 
the United States, Germany, and Canada (Wang, 2013). 
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Figure 3 Geographical distribution of Chinese OFDI stock, 2012 
Source of chart data: MOFCOM and BBVA Research (BBVA, 2013, pp. 6-7) 
 
As Clegg and Voss note, the industry-by-country distribution of Chinese OFDI is 
difficult to determine from Chinese statistics. However, based on their findings, it can 
be stated that Chinese investments in mining industry are taking place mainly in 
institutionally weak and unstable countries with large amounts of natural resources 
and that these investments are normally carried out by SOEs. Investments in 
manufacturing usually take place in large markets with low factor costs, while Chinese 
companies seek technologies, brands, distribution channels and other strategic assets 
in institutionally developed and stable economies (Clegg and Voss 2012, p. 19). 
 
In developed economies Chinese investment is less dominated by natural resource 
seeking or trade-related motives but more concerned with the wide range of 
objectives, including market-, efficiency- and strategic assets-seeking motives (Rosen 
and Hanemann 2013, p. 69 and WIR p. 46). In the case of developed countries, 
Chinese SOEs usually have the majority of deal value but non-state firms make the 
greater share of deals (Rosen and Hanemann 2013, p. 71). In addition to greenfield 
investments and joint ventures, China's merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in 
developed countries has recently gained a momentum and continue an upward trend 
since more and more Chinese firms are interested in buying overseas brands to 
strengthen their own. However, some attempted Chinese acquisitions failed in the 
United States and Australia in recent years (Davies 2013, p. 36). 
 
Overall, Chinese outward investment is a result of a deliberate government policy. 
State help and state owned enterprises are crutial factors explaining Chinese OFDI. It 
is already discussed recently (Kalotay-Sulstarova 2010) that state-owned firms 
possess advantages that facilitate their internationalization (financial and 
administrative support). This can also be extended to privately owned firms whose 
international expansion is seen by the State as strategic priority and as a 
consequence, it is supported by all available means. 
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 Chinese investments in Central and Eastern Europe – facts and trends 
 
As the concept of Central and Eastern Europe is broad, it would be too complicated 
and extensive to conduct a research on the relations of all countries of the region with 
China. Therefore we decided to focus our work on a selection of CEE countries, 
considering their size, position and relation to China. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia are among the most developed and most 
important players of the regions. Although these six countries differ in many respects, 
they have some common features as well. They have been in the process of 
economic catching up over the last decades, their development paths are defined 
mainly by the global and European powers, rules and trends and FDI has a key role in 
restructuring of these economies. Most of the above mentioned countries started to 
get more interested in attracting Chinese investments and boosting trade relations  
since the new millennium. However, the economic and financial crisis of 2008 drew 
the attention of these five countries more than ever to the potential of Chinese 
economic relationship (McCaleb-Szunomár 2014).  
 
Figure 4   China’s OFDI stock in CEEC, 2003-2013, Selected Countries 
 
Source: MOFCOM/NBS 2013, in the case of Slovakia MOFCOM/NBS 2012 
 
The role of Chinese capital in Central and Eastern Europe, compared with all the 
invested capital is still very small, but in the last few years this capital inflow 
accelerated significantly and also played (and plays) an important role in the region's 
recovery from the crisis. In the case of the selected countries there is a growing 
demand for attracting Chinese companies in the last two to five years. The exception 
is Hungary where this process has already begun earlier, after 2003. 
 
International Journal of Business and Management Vol. IV, No. 1 / 2016
33
When searching for possible factors that make the region a favourable investment 
destination for China, the cost and quality of labour is to be considered first: a skilled 
labour force is available in sectors for which Chinese interest is growing, while labour 
costs are lower in the CEE region than the EU average. However, there are 
differences within the region as well; unit labour costs are cheaper in Bulgaria and 
Romania than in Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland. These differences 
don’t seem to really influence Chinese investors as there is more investment in 
Hungary and Poland than in Romania and Bulgaria, however, an explanation for that 
can be the theory of agglomeration effect as generally OFDI in these countries is the 
highest in the region (McCaleb-Szunomár 2014). 
 
Considering the motivation of Chinese investments in CEE, the change of the 
institutional setting of CEE countries due to their economic integration into the EU has 
been the most important driver that has spurred Chinese FDI in the region, especially 
in the manufacturing sector. EU membership of the V4 countries allowed Chinese 
investors to avoid trade barriers and the countries served as an assembly base due to 
the relatively low labour costs (efficiency–seeking, see McCaleb- Szunomár 2014). 
The main type of Chinese FDI in the selected countries is thus market-seeking 
investment: by entering CEE markets Chinese companies have access not only to EU 
market but also to markets of CIS, Mediterranean, EFTA. Another aspect of EU 
membership that has induced Chinese investment in CEECs is institutional stability 
(e.g., protection of property rights) as one of the drivers of Chinese OFDI is unstable 
institutional, economic and political environment of their home country (e.g., Morck et 
al. 2007). It is in line with the findings of Clegg and Voss (2011, 101) who argue that 
Chinese OFDI in the EU shows “an institutional arbitrage strategy”. 
 
Chinese investors typically target secondary and tertiary sectors of the CEE countries. 
Initially, Chinese investment has flowed mostly into manufacturing (assembly), but 
over time services attracted more and more investment too, for example in Hungary 
and Poland there are branches of Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China as well as offices of some of the largest law offices in China, Yingke Law 
Firm (in Hungary in 2010, in Poland in 2012), Dacheng Law Offices (in Poland in 
2011, in Hungary in 2012). Main Chinese investors targeting these countries are 
interested primarily in telecommunication, electronics, chemical industry, 
transportation and energy markets. Their investments are motivated by seeking of 
brands, new technologies or market niches that they can fill in on European markets 
(McCaleb-Szunomár 2014). 
 
According to McCaleb and Szunomár (2014), we can find several examples of state-
level incentives. Since the aftermath of the global financial crisis we can observe 
increased interest of the CEECs governments in attracting Chinese investors. For 
example, Poland started actively promoting itself with Chinese firms since the EXPO 
2010 in Shanghai. Since 2010 Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency 
(PAIZ) has its website available in Chinese, in 2011 it set up its overseas office in 
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Shanghai and in 2013, PAIZ launched website GoPoland.gov.pl in Chinese with the 
goal of attracting Chinese investors to Poland. However, in most of the analyzed 
countries there are voices complaining about their governments’ lack of unified 
strategy towards Chinese investors. Hungary is an exception in this respect as it has 
had historically good political relations with China and earlier than other CEECs, 
intensified bilateral relations in order to attract Chinese FDI. Hungary introduced 
special incentive for foreign investors from outside the EU: a possibility to receive a 
residence visa when fulfilling the requirement of a certain level of investment in 
Hungary4. Moreover, Hungary has the largest Chinese diaspora in the region which is 
an acknowledged attracting factor of Chinese FDI in the extant literature that is a 
relational asset constituting firm’s ownership advantage  (e.g., Buckley et al. 2007).  
 
Country-level analysis5 
As mentioned, the selected six countries give the majority of the population and the 
economic output of the CEE region, and all of them have strengthened their relation 
with China in recent years. Table 1 shows the main features of Chinese investment in 
these economies. 
 
                                                 
4 Third country nationals are allowed to acquire Hungary’s permanent residency status through 
investing in Special Hungarian Government Bonds that have a minimum 5-year maturity. The minimum 
initial investment by each subscriber is 250,000 EUR. 
5  This section is based on the paper of McCaleb A., Szunomár Á. (2014): Chinese foreign direct 
investment in Central and Eastern Europe: an institutional perspective. Unpublished manuscript. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Chinese FDI in CEE-6 countries 
 Hungary Poland Czech 
Republic  
Slovakia Bulgaria Romania 
FDI stock 
(USD, 
2013) 
533 million  226 million  220 million 90 million 147 million 164 million 
Main 
form of 
investme
nt 
Greenfield / 
brownfield, 
M&A, joint 
ventures 
Greenfield, 
(M&A) 
Greenfield
, (M&A) 
Greenfield Greenfield Greenfield 
Main 
sectors 
Chemical, 
IT / ICT, 
electronics, 
wholesales 
and retails, 
banking, 
hotels and 
catering, 
logistics, 
real estate  
IT / ICT, 
electronics, 
heavy 
machinery, 
publishing 
and 
printing, 
real estate 
Electronic
s, IT / ICT, 
transport 
equipment
, food, 
media, 
aviation 
automotiv
e industry, 
IT / ICT  
IT / ICT, 
television, 
agriculture
, 
machinery 
ICT / IT, 
tobacco, 
agriculture, 
machinery, 
transportati
on 
Most 
important 
Chinese 
compani
es 
Wanhua, 
Huawei, 
ZTE, 
Lenovo, 
Sevenstar 
Electronics, 
BYD 
Electronics, 
Comlink 
LiuGong 
Machinery, 
Haoneng 
Packaging, 
Shanxi 
Yuncheng 
Plate-
making 
Group, Sino 
Frontier 
Properties 
Ltd. 
Shanxi 
Yuncheng, 
Changhon
g, Noark, 
Huawei, 
ZTE, 
Shanghai 
Maling 
SaarGum
mi, ZVL 
Auto, 
Inalfa 
Roof 
Systems, 
Mesnac, 
Lenovo, 
Huawei 
Huawei, 
ZTE, 
Shanghai 
Video and 
Audio 
Electronic
s, Great 
Wall 
Motors, 
Tianjin 
State 
Farms, 
Insigma 
Tech. 
Huawei, 
ZTE, 
Shantuo 
Agricultural 
Machinery 
Equipment, 
China 
Tobacco, 
China 
Shipping, 
COSCO, 
Shanxi 
Yuncheng, 
 
Chinese investment to Hungary started to increase significantly after the country 
joined the EU in 2004. According to Chinese statistics, it means a real rapid increase 
from 0.65 million US dollars in 2005 to 370.1 million US dollars in 2010. In 2010, 
Hungary itself took 89% of the whole Chinese capital flow to the region (Chen, 2012). 
By 2013, the amount of Chinese investments has further increased and reached 533 
million USD according to MOFCOM data, which is by far the highest in the region. 
Nevertheless, this amount is far greater when taking cumulative Hungarian data into 
account, since a significant portion of Chinese investment is received via intermediary 
countries or companies, therefore it appears elsewhere in Chinese statistics. 
According to Hungarian reports (cumulative data), Chinese investment in Hungary 
was about 3 billion USD by 2014. More than 1.5 billion USD from that is the 
investment of the Chinese chemical company Wanhua, which acquired a 96 per cent 
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stake in the Hungarian chemical company BorsodChem through its Dutch subsidiary 
in 2010 and 2011. This subsidiary also made some investment for the development of 
BorsodChem later. It is the largest Chinese investment in CEE so far. Although 
Chinese multinational companies represent a relatively small share of total FDI stock 
in Hungary, they have saved and/or created jobs and contributed to the economic 
growth of Hungary with their investments and exports during the crisis. Furthermore, 
many of them (e.g. Lenovo, ZTE, Huawei, Bank of China) have turned their Hungarian 
businesses into the European regional hub of their activities (Szunomár et al., 2014). 
 
Although Poland is the leading recipient of FDI in the CEE region it attracted less 
Chinese FDI than Hungary. Before Poland’s entry into the EU Chinese investments 
were almost insignificant as in 2000 they amounted to 10 USD million and in 2003 
increased slightly to 17.8 USD million6. According to Polish data, Chinese FDI stock in 
Poland increased more than sixteen times to 288.1 USD million by the end of 2012. 
However their importance is low as they represent only 0.1% of Poland’s total FDI 
stock. According to MOFCOM, China’s FDI stock in Poland amounted to 226 USD 
million at the end of 2013, however, as mentioned above, statistics on China’s OFDI 
differ between MOFCOM’s and host countries’ national sources (Clegg and Voss 
2012). In addition to intermediaries or subsidiaries these differences may result from 
limitations of Chinese data7 
 
Czech Republic is also one of the most successful CEE countries in attracting foreign 
direct investment although Chinese investments were negligible till 2012. According to 
Chinese statistics Chinese FDI in Czech Republic started to increase from 2006 (in 
2005 it was 1,38 million USD, compared with 14.67 million USD in 2006) and reached 
66,83 million USD in 2011, which was still the lowest amount of the five selected 
countries. The turning point was 2012 when Chinese statistics showed 202,45 million 
USD investment to the Czech Republic8. However, there is an inverse discrepancy 
here as according to data from Czech National Bank, the Chinese FDI in Czech 
Republic was 76,6 million USD in 20129. In 2013, according to Chinese data, Chinese 
FDI stock was 220 million USD. 
 
The amount of Chinese investments was insignificant in Slovakia prior to 2007. From 
2007 on we can observe varying levels of Chinese investments in the country. 
According to Turcsányi (2014, p. 97) “While little can be asserted due to large 
fluctuation, we can notice the start of the investments even before the crisis. 
Consequently, the investments increased, yet it is difficult to establish whether this 
                                                 
6 National Bank of Poland data 
7 MOFCOM data are underreported as they include investments approved by MOFCOM. Thus, in 
practice investment projects (especially small projects) that do not require approval or unauthorized 
projects are not included. The recent administrative reforms decentralized approval system of smaller 
investment projects which may enhance under-reporting. 
8 Total FDI to Czech Republic was 10,6 billion USD according to UNCTAD. 
9 The official statistics explain this huge increase with the recalculation of stock for 2012 after 
adjustment of historical data. Experts in Czech Republic had no information on the components of this 
growth. 
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was the result of the crisis or some other factors, which may include natural 
development of Chinese investors’ increasingly available source and willingness to 
penetrate new destinations.” According to Chinese statistics Chinese OFDI stock in 
Slovakia was a bit below 90 million USD in 2012 (data from 2013 was no available). 
The definite number of Chinese investment is hard to tell, but according to available 
sources it can be established that it is relatively modest – compared both to 
neighbouring countries and to other investors in Slovakia, including other Asian 
companies. According to Turcsányi’s estimates (2014, p. 98), “in case also companies 
owned by a non-Chinese based but Chinese-owned subsidiary are counted, we can 
estimate current Chinese investments in Slovakia to be up to 100-200 million EUR.” 
 
Chinese FDI in Romania was the highest among all CEECs until 200510, now – 
according to Chinese statistics – Romania is only the fourth largest recipient in CEECs 
after Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic with Chinese FDI worth of 163,8 million 
USD. Chinese FDI in Bulgaria started to become noticeable from 2007 when Bulgaria 
joined the EU. According to Chinese data, it increased seven-fold from 18,6 million 
USD in 2010 to 147,4 million in 2013. 
 
Trade with China 
 
Certainly, the European Union has a dominant role in the trade of the CEE countries. 
The share of Asian countries is much less, but their role has increased during the past 
years (Éltető-Szunomár 2014). Trade increase towards Asia has been more dynamic 
than towards the EU or towards non-EU regions (Éltető-Toporowski 2013). The weight 
of Asia is generally more significant in imports than in exports of CEE 6 countries 
(Table 2).11Trade dynamism is largely due to the trade with China, that has become 
the most important partner within Asia. Between 2000-2014 China’s share increased 
in the export of CEE-6 but the increase is even more significant in their import. In the 
case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia around 6% of their import stems 
from China, while for Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria this share is around 4%. 
 
                                                 
10 In 2005, Chinese investment was 39,43 million USD in Romania according to Chinese 
statistics, which further increased in the coming years, but to a lesser extent compared to Hungary and 
Poland. 
11 An exception is Bulgaria where Asia has more than 10% share in total exports. This (and the 
relatively high Romanian figures also) is due to the deliveries of petroleum oil products to Singapore, 
the Middle East and CIS area performed by the Bulgarian and Romanian refineries of Russian Lukoil 
company. 
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Table 2  Share of EU, Asia and China in the foreign trade of the CEE-6 countries 
 EU  Asia China 
 Export Import Export Import Export Import 
 2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 
Czech 
Republic 
85.9 81.8 
 
75.2 
 
77.1 4.0 5.2 8.2 13.9 0.2 1.2 2.2 6.2 
Hungary 83.6 78.4 66.1 74.3 3.4 4.8 16.8 11.8 0.1 1.7 2.9 6.3 
Poland 81.2 76.8 
 
69.0 69.0 3.4 4.9 10.5 12.3 0.3 1.0 2.8 6.4 
Slovakia 89.8 83.9 70.2 75.8 1.8 3.9 5.7 12.4 0.1 2.1 1.4 4.0 
Romania 72.2 70.8 65.3 75.2 6.4 6.8 9.0 10.9 0.8 1.1 1.3 4.0 
Bulgaria 56.2 62.1 52.9 61.4 6.2 11.6 5.3 7.9 0.8 2.4 1.0 3.3 
Source: calculations from Eurostat Comext 
 
Figure 5 shows trade figures for eleven Central and East European countries. Five 
CEE countries (the Baltic countries and Slovenia, Croatia) have quite low trade with 
China. Within the whole CEE region the four Visegrad countries show the highest 
trade flows, followed by Romania and Bulgaria. Therefore we focus on the trade 
patterns of these six countries (CEE-6). 
 
Figure 5. Trade with China in 2014, mn euros 
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Source: Eurostat Comext 
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A common feature of CEE trade with China is the considerable deficit that is present in 
every country. Poland as the largest country has the highest deficit among all. This 
deficit has had a constant increasing trend in the past fifteen years for the CEE 
countries, only in the case of Hungary and the Czech Republic can we observe a 
decrease since 2010-2011. 
 
The mentioned dynamic increase of CEE-6 export to China is shown by Figure 6. Two 
groups of countries can be clearly distinguished: the four Visegrad countries and 
Romania-Bulgaria. In case of the V4 export increase is radical from 2003 onwards, 
reaching similar level in 2013. The trend is broken in 2014 for Slovakia and Hungary 
but continues for Poland and the Czech Republic.  In the case of Romania and 
Bulgaria, the increase takes place from 2009, most probably as a consequence of the 
crisis (searching for new markets outside the EU). Otherwise, for all six countries the 
upward trend was not even broken by the general world trade collapse in 2009. 
 
Figure  6.  Development of CEE-6 exports to China, mn euro 
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Source: Eurostat Comext 
 
Traded products 
 
Applying the more detailed product classification of SITC 3 we calculated the shares 
of the first five product groups in the given countries’ trade. (This classification 
contains almost 300 product groups). In most cases we find high concentration of 
trade. The most extreme case is of Slovakia, where more than 70% of exports to 
China are given by one group: motor cars (see Table 3).12 However, in 2014-15 
                                                 
12The most popular cars exported from Slovakia to China are the Audi Q7 and the Volkswagen 
Touareg. In 2012 the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands was an 
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Chinese demand for luxury cars stagnated or decreased and this has affected the 
Slovakian export performance13. 
 
Hungarian exports are dominated by engines since the mid-2000 years, although their 
share in exports decreased from almost 50% in 2009 to 18% in 2014. The reason for 
this decrease is that the Hungarian affiliate of the Volkswagen Group (Audi Hungaria) 
decreased its delivery of engines radically to the Chinese affiliate of the VW Group 
(FAW-Volkswagen, a joint venture between FAW Group and Volkswagen Group which 
manufactures Audi and Volkswagen passenger cars for sale in China). This decrease 
had an effect on the total Hungarian export to China. 
 
Bulgarian export is also heavily concentrated (more than 50%) to the same article that 
Poland delivers too (more than 30%) that is copper. Although this is a raw material, it 
is a base material for producing integrated circuits and electronic parts, the key 
components of electronic devices produced in GVCs. Europe's second biggest copper 
producer is the Polish KGHM PolskaMiedź S.A. and closely cooperates with Chinese 
Minmetals. Thus, with this base material Poland and Bulgaria also participate in 
multinational networks, but in a lower, non-high-tech intensive level. Czech exports 
are the least concentrated and the main product group changed each year. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
advantage for the  Slovakian industry. Because of the conflict, the Chinese boycotted Japanese 
vehicles and turned to German models instead. Volkswagen produces the three big sports models  
which were in high demand in China:  the Bratislava factory produces the VW Touareg and Audi Q7 
models as well as the bodywork for the Porsche Cayenne (http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/news-
brief/2839471-china-and-japan-spat-provides-work-slovaks). Furthermore, the Volkswagen plant in 
Slovakia also began exports of Skoda cars to China in 2013  
(http://www.automotivelogisticsmagazine.com/intelligence/vws-european-exports-to-china-will-still-
grow). 
13 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/656ddbc8-4d63-11e5-9b5d-89a026fda5c9.html#axzz3nOhkB8Qd 
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Table 3.  The most important export products to China, percentage of total export 
 2000 2007 2009 2010 2014 
 AUTOMATIC 
DATA-
PROCESSING 
MACHINES 
INTERNAL 
COMBUSTION 
PISTON 
ENGINES 
INTERNAL 
COMBUSTIO
N PISTON 
ENGINES 
INTERNAL 
COMBUSTION 
PISTON ENGINES 
INTERNAL 
COMBUSTION 
PISTON 
ENGINES 
HU 17,75 44,80 48,45 35,77 18,18 
 COPPER ORES 
AND 
CONCENTRAT
ES 
COPPER COPPER COPPER COPPER 
BU 40,60 29,12 36,30 54,51 55,28 
 MOTOR CARS 
AND OTHER 
MOTOR 
VEHICLES 
PARTS AND 
ACCESSORIES 
of  MACHINES 
TRANSMISSI
ON SHAFTS 
GEARING 
PARTS AND 
ACCESSORIES OF  
MOTOR VEHICLES  
ELECTRICAL 
APPARATUS 
FOR 
SWITCHING 
CZ 22,75 10,20 8,40 8,21 11,45 
 COPPER COPPER COPPER COPPER COPPER 
PL 46,37 29,89 34,11 36,93 31,48 
 WOOD, SIMPLY 
WORKED, AND 
RAILWAY 
SLEEPERS OF 
WOOD 
NON-FERROUS 
BASE METAL 
WASTE AND 
SCRAP, N.E.S. 
NON-
FERROUS 
BASE METAL 
WASTE AND 
SCRAP, 
N.E.S. 
NON-FERROUS 
BASE METAL WASTE 
AND SCRAP, N.E.S. 
WOOD, SIMPLY 
WORKED, AND 
RAILWAY 
SLEEPERS OF 
WOOD 
RO 34,95 29,80 18,86 17,05 12,61 
 OTHER 
MACHINERY 
AND 
EQUIPMENT 
MOTOR CARS 
AND OTHER 
MOTOR 
VEHICLES 
MOTOR 
CARS AND 
OTHER 
MOTOR 
VEHICLES 
MOTOR CARS AND 
OTHER MOTOR 
VEHICLES 
MOTOR CARS 
AND OTHER 
MOTOR 
VEHICLES 
SK 30,77 64,72 72,12 75,73 74,43 
Source: calculations from Eurostat 
 
In the last two years the export of CEE agricultural products to China gained certain 
impetus. Chinese authorities usually undertake a long period of examination and 
allowance of these products into the Chinese market. Hungary recently received 
permission to export beef (although there is no significant delivery so far) and milk 
products (being third after Poland and Bulgaria) and more and more firms can export 
pork too. In the beginning of 2015 Chinese authorities approved import of Romanian 
frozen pork meat14. This is realised by Smithfield Romania SA, which was an affiliate 
of Smithfield large US global food company present in 13 countries.The Chinese WH 
Group acquired Smithfield in 2013. The Constanta port in Romania has strategic 
significance in trade,15 the biggest Chinese cereal trader firm even bought terminal 
there.16  Czech beer export increased significantly last year17 and it will increase 
                                                 
14http://www.globalmeatnews.com/Industry-Markets/Romania-to-relaunch-pork-exports-to-China 
15http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2014/10/30/romania-china-agrimins-pay-working-visit-to-constanta-
port-17-13-22 
16http://www.nineoclock.ro/china%E2%80%99s-cofco-buys-cereal-terminal-in-constanta-port/ 
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further as the Chinese CEFC group bought majority share in the Czech Lobkowicz 
brewery.18 
 
On the import side the leading products for several CEE-6 countries are 
telecommunication equipments (Table 4). These are the most significant in the 
Hungarian import from China, taking up 40-55 percent since years. Their weight is 
relatively significant in the Slovakian and Romanian and Czech import also. The least 
concentrated is the Bulgarian import, thus this pattern differs from the others. In 
general terms, for most CEE countries import from China dropped in 2009 due to the 
crisis, but afterwards gained momentum again.  
 
Table   4.   The most important import products from China, percentage of total export 
 2000 2007 2009 2010 2014 
 ORGANO-INORGANIC 
COMPOUNDS, 
HETEROCYCLIC 
COMPOUNDS, 
NUCLEIC ACIDS AND 
THEIR SALTS, AND 
SULPHONAMIDES 
HEATING 
AND 
COOLING 
EQUIPMENT 
AND PARTS 
THEREOF, 
N.E.S. 
TELECOMMUNIC
ATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
BU 9,08 7,48 5,00 5,51 4,02 
 AUTOMATIC DATA-
PROCESSING 
MACHINES AND 
UNITS. 
PARTS AND 
ACCESSORI
ES  
MACHINES 
PARTS AND 
ACCESSORIES 
MACHINES 
AUTOMATIC 
DATA-
PROCESSIN
G MACHINES 
AUTOMATIC 
DATA-
PROCESSIN
G MACHINES 
CZ  8,56 17,29 19,74 18,65 23,68 
 TELECOMMUNICATIO
NS EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMUNIC
ATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
HU 18,91 41,01 49,67 56,54 42,66 
 BABY CARRIAGES, 
TOYS, GAMES AND 
SPORTING GOODS 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
PARTS AND 
ACCESSORIES 
MACHINES 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
PL 9,76 8,60 11,61 12,20 11,75 
 FOOTWEAR TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMUNIC
ATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
RO 12,77 9,65 33,01 39,06 12,77 
 BABY CARRIAGES, 
TOYS, GAMES AND 
SPORTING GOODS 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMUNIC
ATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
TELECOMMU
NICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
SK 8,52 47,19 31,94 35,67 22,30 
Source: calculations from Eurostat 
 
The pattern of trade between China and CEE-6 has changed somewhat in the last 
decade. In certain cases concentration increased and in other areas decreased. 
                                                                                                                                                          
17 http://www.czech.cz/en/Comercio/Czech-beer-exports-to-China-doubled-last-year 
18 http://www.praguepost.com/food-and-drink/49628-cefc-gains-79-percent-in-pivovary-lobkowicz 
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These structural changes generally resulted in the increase of high-tech intensity of 
trade in certain CEE countries. The high tech export volume and share to China has 
been the highest in the case of Hungary and quite high for the Czech Republic but low 
in the case of the other countries. In general the CEE-China trade is much more high-
tech intensive than the CEE-EU trade (Éltető-Szunomár 2015). 
  
The high technology intensity of trade is mainly due to the above described large flows 
of automotive, electronic and telecommunications products. This is based on the 
activity of multinational companies in the global production networks (see Éltető-
Toporowski 2013 and Ando-Kimura, 2013 as already mentioned).  The bulk of foreign 
trade between CEE countries and China has been and still can be bound to certain 
products and certain (multinational) companies. Because the volume of trade is 
relative small (compared to for example the trade with EU or Germany) a one decision 
of a global company concerning relocation or change in internal deliveries among 
affiliates can significantly change the trade volumes of a given country vis-á-vis China.  
Relocating plants from Hungary, for example, decreased the Hungarian export 
capacity to Asia significantly in 2012-1319. 
 
Figure  7.    Share of foreign value added in exports, 2011, % 
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Source: TiVA database (OECD-WTO)20 
The observed pattern of CEE-China trade reinforces that they are differently 
integrated into the GVCs. This has been already shown at worldwide trade level. 
Based on world input-output table data, Timmer et al. (2012) show that the use of 
imported intermediate inputs and the inclusion in global value chains have increased 
                                                 
19 In 2012 Nokia downgraded its affiliate in Hungary, switched assembly to Nokia’s plants in South 
Korea and in Beijing. Therefore, in 2012 the  previously huge export of cellular phones from Hungary 
decreased. In 2014 Microsoft (the owner of Nokia Komárom) announced the closure of the firm. 
 
20 https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=66237 
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radically between 1995 and 2008 in the case of the Central and Eastern European 
countries. Stehrer and Stöllinger (2012) have similar results when analysing forty 
countries. They use the foreign value added content of exports as a measure of 
vertical specialisation and GVC inclusion. Between 1995 and 2011 this foreign value 
added increased in almost all observed countries. Based on these data Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and even Bulgaria are especially strongly linked to GVCs 
(see Figure 7), but Poland and Romania to a lesser extent. These latter are large 
countries, Polish and Romanian export structure is more dispersed and, in general, 
the effect of foreign multinational companies on export seems to be lower than in other 
CE countries. 
 
Conclusion 
In our paper we analysed Chinese investment in the Central and Eastern European 
countries as well as mutual trade relations.  
 
Regarding investment, our paper showed that Chinese investors have mostly 
searched for markets in CEE countries as the region’s EU membership allows 
Chinese companies to treat the CEE region as a ‘back door’ to the affluent EU 
markets (tariff-jumping FDI). Chinese investors are attracted by the relatively low labor 
costs, skilled workforce, and market potential. It is characteristic that their investment 
pattern in terms of country location resembles that of the world total FDI in the region. 
Our paper also showed that the CEE region (including the selected group of countries) 
is not homogeneous and that there are differences in the economic relations and 
strategies between CEE countries and East Asia, too. 
 
The global financial crisis had further accelerated the development of China-CEE 
economic relations as CEE countries started to search for new opportunities for their 
recovery from the recession. For example, Hungary's “Opening to the East” policy was 
initiated after (and partly as a result of) the crisis, but the crisis also made Poland, 
Romania and Bulgaria look eastward. China took these opportunities and has 
increased sectoral representation of Chinese firms in CEE countries in recent years. 
Another reason for this higher Chinese representation could be a diversification 
strategy, because recently Chinese global investment strategy places great emphasis 
on diversification in all respects. After the crisis, both mergers and acquisitions and 
joint venture investments started to become more and more popular among Chinese 
investors in the CEE region as their motivations have expanded toward strategic-asset 
and efficiency seeking. According to our research results, this process will continue in 
the future. 
 
Overall, it can be stated that FDI and trade are closely connected. If Chinese firms buy 
companies in CEE countries that can enhance mutual trade. The internal trade of a 
multinational firm among its affiliates in CEE and China can also increase trade flows. 
Investment behaviour and motivation of Chinese firms in the CEE area can be 
International Journal of Business and Management Vol. IV, No. 1 / 2016
45
explained best by the eclectic paradigm of Dunning with a special regard to the role of 
state. 
 
CEE countries are not homogeneous either regarding the trade intensity or the 
dispersion of Chinese investment. The trade structure of three Visegrád countries 
differs from Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary 
are included in the global production networks at another level. Their production and 
trade are more based on high tech products, mainly in the car and electronic industry. 
Regarding Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, they supply China with copper, wood and 
other low-tech products. 
 
In our paper we have found that the bulk of trade flows between China and the CEE 
countries can well be explained and described by the theory and literature on global 
production networks. 
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